

A DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY OF AFRICAN ATTITUDES ON BRIBERY

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines ethical opinion on bribe taking in four African countries – South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Nineteen demographic variables (gender, age, marital status, etc.) are also examined. Although all countries expressed a strong opposition to bribe taking, opposition was stronger in some countries than others. Most of the demographic variables proved to be significant.

Key Words: bribery, ethics, rent seeking, demographic variables, gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, education level, employment status, occupation, social class, income level, size of town, health, happiness, confidence in the police, confidence in the justice system, confidence in government, left-right political spectrum, Africa, South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda

JEL Codes: D01, D23, D6, D72, D73, E26, I1, I2, I3, J1, J12, J14, J16, K14, K42, O55, O57

INTRODUCTION

One might think that bribery is always unethical. Studies by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2011) discourage the practice and a number of other studies have viewed bribery in negative terms (Bonucci & Moulette, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Darrough, 2010; Moran, 1999; Pacini, Swingen & Rogers, 2002; Scharf, 2008).

However, a closer examination of the issue reveals that the question of whether bribery is ethical or unethical is not so clear-cut in some cases. For example, bribing a prison guard to release a political prisoner who is being held by a corrupt or evil regime might constitute an ethical act (Roy & Singer, 2006). From a utilitarian ethical perspective, bribery would be acceptable in cases where there are more winners than losers.

This paper reviews the ethical literature on bribery and reports the findings of a survey of opinion in four African countries – South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Rwanda.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Many articles and several books have been written about various aspects of bribery. This paper focuses on the ethical literature on the topic. When trying to determine whether bribery is ethical or unethical, a threshold question to ask is which set of ethical principles to apply. Ethicists have several options in their toolkit, and not all ethical systems arrive at the same result in any given situation.

Baron, Pettit and Slote (1997) identify and discuss three of the main ethical systems. Graham (2004) discusses eight ethical systems. Most ethical systems, when analyzed and closely compared, usually fall within the general categories of utilitarianism, rights theory, or virtue ethics, broadly defined.

Virtue ethics goes back to the time of Aristotle (2002), if not before. The main thrust of virtue ethics is that an act or policy

is good if the result is human flourishing. Utilitarian ethics holds that an act or policy is ethical if the result is the greatest good for the greatest number, or if the winners exceed the losers, or if the result is what economists call a positive-sum game (Brandt, 1992; Frey, 1984; Goodin, 1995; McGee, 2012a; Wong & Beckman, 1992). These various utilitarian views are not quite the same, but they are similar. If a policy or act results in human flourishing, it could meet both the virtue ethics test and the utilitarian ethics test.

Within utilitarian ethics is a branch that holds that something that increases efficiency is ethical. Richard Posner (1983, 1998), the American jurist and co-founder of the Law & Economics movement, takes this position. This view has been criticized (McGee, 2012a), but it remains a mainstream utilitarian position.

Rights theory holds that an act is unethical if someone's rights are violated, regardless of whether the winners exceed the losers (Baron, Pettit & Slote, 1997; Brandt, 1992; McGee, 2012a, b & c). One of the main criticisms of utilitarian ethics is that rights are disregarded. Taking a rights approach overcomes this deficiency in utilitarian ethics.

Kantian ethics, named after Immanuel Kant (1952, 1983), focuses on duty. If someone has a duty and breaches that duty, any such act is considered to be unethical. The Kantian view may be applied to bribery in cases where the receiver of the bribe is an agent who has a duty to the principal to do what is in the best interest of the principal. An agent who acts against the best interest of the principal is acting unethically.

Most of the literature on ethical aspects of bribery does not cite philosophers or particular ethical theories, at least not directly. However, much of the literature has an underlying premise that either utilitarian ethics or principles of duty should be applied. Virtue ethics and rights theory also appear in some analyses, although most studies on bribery are done by economists or lawyers, who tend to be utilitarians, at least most of the time.

Logue (2005) believes that bribery is always unethical because it violates absolute moral principles that cannot be compromised. He goes on to say that bribery is basically unfair and results in an inefficient allocation of resources, and frustrates the constructive role of government. Carson (1987) believes that accepting a bribe is always *prima facie* wrong because it violates duties, but makes some exceptions, such as in cases of conscripted soldiers, some prostitutes and others who are held as virtual slaves.

Johnsen (2009, 2010) applies cost-benefit analysis to determine whether paying a bribe results in a positive-sum game. Shaw (1988) points out that benefits and costs may not be easy to determine.

Some scholars assert that bribery may serve a useful function if a bribe acts to grease the wheels of commerce, which makes commerce work more efficiently. Such would be the case where a corrupt government or inefficient bureaucracy can be circumvented by paying someone to cut red tape or otherwise go around the rules. Some scholars take the position that, in general, bribery may be ethical in cases where it is a helping hand, but unethical when it is paid to a grabbing hand who offers nothing in return for the payment (Colombatto, 2003; Egger & Winner, 2005; Houston, 2007; Johnsen, 2009, 2010). Wong and Beckman (1992) developed a point system to determine whether the helping hand or grabbing hand predominates.

Several studies have examined bribery in connection with other forms of corruption, with a focus it has on foreign direct investment (FDI). Cuervo-Cazurra (2006, 2008) and Mauro (1995) found that bribery decreased FDI, whereas Egger and Winner (2005) found that bribery acts to stimulate FDI in cases where it acts as a helping hand. Weitzel and Berns (2006) found that host country corruption is negatively associated with premiums paid in cross-country mergers. Sanyal and Samanta (2010) found that bribery has a negative effect on economic growth.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study analyzes the opinions on bribe taking of sample populations in South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Some demographic variables are also examined.

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this study were taken from the Human Beliefs and Values (HBV) surveys. Data for these surveys were collected by social scientists all over the world and cover a wide range of issues relating to perceptions of life, environment, work, family, politics and society, religion and morale and national identity. The present study analyzes the data reflecting attitudes on bribery. The question asked whether the respondent believed that accepting a bribe in the course of one's duties was justifiable. Responses were measured on a 10-point Likert scale where 1 is never justifiable and 10 is always justifiable.

Results were compiled overall and some demographic variables were also examined to determine whether differences in belief were significant. The next section reports on the findings.

FINDINGS

The next few pages report on the findings of the study.

Overall Results

Table 1 shows the overall results. An examination of the mean scores shows that respondents in Ethiopia were more opposed to bribe taking than were any of the other groups. South African and Ghana were tied for least opposed.

	South Africa		Ghana		Ethiopia		Rwanda	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Never justifiable 1	1705	57.9%	883	58.7%	1121	75.0%	739	49.2%
2	432	14.7%	233	15.5%	247	16.5%	347	23.1%
3	211	7.2%	118	7.8%	66	4.4%	169	11.2%
4	103	3.5%	59	3.9%	7	0.5%	73	4.9%
5	184	6.2%	46	3.1%	24	1.6%	76	5.1%
6	63	2.1%	18	1.2%	9	0.6%	43	2.9%
7	70	2.4%	17	1.1%	3	0.2%	14	0.9%
8	84	2.9%	22	1.5%	7	0.5%	15	1.0%
9	37	1.3%	31	2.1%	2	0.1%	15	1.0%
Always justifiable 10	57	1.9%	78	5.2%	9	0.6%	12	0.8%
Total	2946	100.0%	1505	100.0%	1495	100.0%	1503	100.0%
Mean	2.4		2.4		1.5		2.2	
Standard Deviation	2.24		2.50		1.20		1.80	

Comparison of p-Values

Table 2 compares the p values. All differences in mean scores were statistically significant, meaning that Ethiopia was significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were any of the other countries in the study; Rwanda was significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were South Africa or Ghana. Those in South Africa and Ghana were equally opposed to bribe taking, and were significantly less opposed than respondents in the other two countries.

	Ghana	Ethiopia	Rwanda
South Africa	1.0000	<0.001	0.0027
Ghana		<0.001	0.0119
Ethiopia			<0.001

Gender

Gender has been examined in connection with many ethical studies over the years. Some studies found that women were more ethical than men (Hoffman, 1998; Miesing & Preble, 1985; Ruegger & King, 1992; Whitley, 1998), while other studies concluded that men were more ethical than women (Barnett & Karson, 1987; Weeks et al., 1999). A third group of studies found that men and women were equally ethical (Barnett & Karson, 1989; Roxas & Stoneback, 2004; Sims et al., 1996).

Some tax evasion studies found that women were more opposed to tax evasion than men (McGee & Bose, 2009 – Australia; McGee & Guo, 2007 – China; McGee & Maranjyan, 2012 – accounting practitioners in South Florida), while other studies found men to be more opposed to tax evasion than women (McGee, 2006 – Romania; McGee & Benk, 2011 – Turkey; McGee & Tusan, 2008 – Slovakia). A third group of studies found that men and women were equally opposed to tax evasion (McGee & Noronha, 2008 – Southern China and Macau; McGee, Petrides & Ross, 2012 – Mexico; McGee & Rossi, 2008 – Argentina).

Mocan (2004) found that men were more likely to be asked for a bribe. Torgler and Valev (2010) found that women were less likely to justify accepting a bribe. Comparative studies of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) found that women were significantly more opposed to bribe taking, while a study of Egypt found that men were significantly more opposed to bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 3a reports the statistics for the gender variable. Overall, females were more opposed to bribe taking. The difference was significant at the 5 percent level.

Table 3b ranks the mean scores. Ethiopian females were most opposed to bribe taking, followed closely by Ethiopian males. Males in Ghana were least opposed. An ANOVA found that the differences in mean scores were significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 3a				
RANKING BY GENDER				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Gender	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Female	2.1	2.06	3697
2	Male	2.2	2.10	3751
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN MEAN SCORES				
p value				
Male v. Female		0.0381		
Table 3b				
RANKING BY COUNTRY & GENDER				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank				Mean
1	Ethiopia – Female			1.4
2	Ethiopia – Male			1.5
3	Rwanda – Female			2.2
4	South Africa – Female			2.3
4	Ghana – Female			2.3
4	Rwanda – Male			2.3
7	South Africa – Male			2.4
8	Ghana – Male			2.5

Age

Most studies of age have found that people become more ethical or have more respect for the law as they get older (Babakus et al., 2004; Ruegger & King, 1992; McGee, 2012d), although there have been some exceptions (Babakus et al., 2004; Sims et al., 1996; McGee, 2012d).

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that older people were more strongly opposed to bribe taking than were younger people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A

comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia reached a similar result (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). A study of Egypt found that those in the oldest group were more opposed to bribe taking than were those in younger age groups, but the difference was significant only at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 4a ranks the mean scores by age, overall. The two older age groups had identical mean scores. The youngest group was somewhat less opposed to bribe taking than the other two age groups. The ANOVA p value in Table 4b shows that the differences in mean scores were significant only at the 12 percent level.

Rank	Age	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	30-49	2.1	1.99	2739
1	50+	2.1	2.07	1212
3	15-29	2.2	2.15	3497

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	18.551	2	9.275	2.145	0.117
Within Groups	32,192.028	7,445	4.324		
Total	32,210.579	7,447			

Table 4c ranks the mean scores by age group and country. Ethiopians in the 50+ age group were most opposed to bribe taking; the youngest age groups in South Africa and Ghana were least opposed to bribe taking. The three Ethiopia groups were more opposed to bribe taking than were any of the other groups. In general, the oldest group in each country was more opposed to bribe taking than the youngest group.

Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – 50+	1.4
2	Ethiopia – 15-29	1.5
2	Ethiopia – 30-49	1.5
4	South Africa – 50+	2.1
4	Rwanda – 30-49	2.1
6	Rwanda – 50+	2.2
7	South Africa – 30-49	2.3
7	Ghana – 50+	2.3
7	Rwanda – 15-29	2.3
10	Ghana – 30-49	2.4
11	South Africa – 15-29	2.5
11	Ghana – 15-29	2.5

Ethnicity

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that whites were more strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by East Asians, Hispanics, half-breed black/white and blacks (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that Caucasians were most

opposed to bribe taking, followed by half breed black/white, and black (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 5a ranks the mean scores by ethnicity. The Ethiopian Oromiya group was the most opposed to bribe taking, followed closely by the Ethiopia Amhara group. The black/other black group was least opposed.

Rank	Ethnicity	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Ethiopian -Oromiya	1.3	0.85	321
2	Ethiopian -Amhara	1.4	1.11	680
2	Other	1.4	1.08	216
4	White / Caucasian White	1.8	1.68	321
5	Coloured (dark)	2.0	2.09	205
6	Ghana: Akan	2.2	2.26	900
6	Ghana: Ewe	2.2	1.57	184
8	Black -Other / Black	2.4	2.13	3862

Table 5b shows that the ANOVA p value was significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	1,023.246	7	146.178	38.041	<0.001
Within Groups	25,672.612	6,681	3.843		
Total	26,695.858	6,688			

Importance of Religion in Life

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that those at both ends of the spectrum had the strongest opposition to bribe taking, while those in the middle groups had less opposition (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that those who did not hold religion very important in life were slightly more opposed to bribe taking than those who held religion to be important. The difference was significant only at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Importance of religion in life was found not to be a significant variable in an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 6a ranks mean scores on the basis of the importance of religion in life. Those who thought religion was very important were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, while those least opposed thought that religion was not at all important in life. However, the relationship was not strictly linear because those who

thought religion was not very important were more opposed to bribe taking than were those who thought religion was rather important.

Rank	Importance	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Very important	2.0	2.03	5199
2	Not very important	2.3	2.20	336
3	Rather Important	2.5	2.12	1759
4	Not at all important	2.8	2.69	121

Table 6b shows the ANOVA p value between groups. The differences in mean scores are significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	390.971	3	130.324	30.361	0.000
Within Groups	31,811.325	7,411	4.292		
Total	32,202.296	7,414			

Religion

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that Protestants and Spiritistas were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by Evangelicals, Muslims, Roman Catholics and Buddhists (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). Religion was found not to be a significant variable in a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) and a study of Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 7a ranks the mean scores by religion. Orthodox were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by Protestants, Pentecostals, Roman Catholics, Evangelicals, and the Independent African Church. Muslims were least opposed.

Rank	Religion	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Orthodox	1.5	1.14	1033
2	Protestant	2.1	2.05	2456
3	Pentecostal	2.2	2.07	61
4	Roman Catholic	2.3	2.02	1475
4	Evangelical	2.3	2.19	290
4	Other	2.3	2.32	211
7	Independent African Church (e.g. ZCC, Shembe, etc.)	2.5	2.23	503
8	Muslim	2.6	2.63	631

Table 7b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference in mean scores is significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 7b					
Religion and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	676.408	7	96.630	23.545	<0.001
Within Groups	27,300.348	6,652	4.104		
Total	27,976.756	6,659			

Table 7c ranks mean scores by religion and country. Most of the Ethiopian groups were in the most opposed categories. The two least opposed groups were both from Ghana. Not all religions were represented in each country.

Table 7c		
RANKING BY COUNTRY & RELIGION		
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Roman Catholic	1.1
2	Ethiopia – Muslim	1.4
2	Ethiopia – Orthodox	1.4
2	Ethiopia – Protestant	1.4
5	South Africa – Muslim	1.5
6	Ghana – Orthodox	1.6
7	South Africa – Orthodox	1.8
8	Ghana – Roman Catholic	1.9
9	Rwanda – Orthodox	2.0
10	Rwanda – Muslim	2.1
11	South Africa – Other	2.2

11	South Africa – Pentecostal	2.2
11	Ghana – Protestant	2.2
11	Rwanda – Protestant	2.2
15	South Africa – Evangelical	2.3
15	South Africa – Protestant	2.3
15	Rwanda – Roman Catholic	2.3
	South Africa – Independent	
18	African Church (e.g. ZCC, Shembe, etc.)	2.5
19	South Africa – Roman Catholic	2.6
20	Ethiopia – Other	3.0
20	Rwanda – Other	3.0
22	Ghana – Other	4.0
23	Ghana – Muslim	4.1

Religiosity

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that religiosity was not a significant variable (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that the less religious a person was, the less resistance there was to bribe taking. The results were significant at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). A study of Egyptian opinion found that religious people were significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were those who were not religious (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 8a ranks mean scores on the basis of religiosity. The relationship is curvilinear. Those who are religious had an average mean score that was between the two nonreligious groups.

Table 8a				
RANKING BY RELIGIOUS PERSON				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Religious	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Not a religious person	2.1	1.93	975
2	A religious person	2.2	2.08	6271
3	A convinced atheist	2.8	2.65	48

Table 8b shows that the ANOVA p value between groups is significant at the 5 percent level.

Table 8b					
Religious Person and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	26.383	2	13.191	3.094	0.045
Within Groups	31,084.638	7,291	4.263		
Total	31,111.021	7,293			

Marital Status

Marital status was examined as a variable in a number of tax evasion studies. The results were mixed (McGee, 2012d). In a

study of corruption, Torgler and Valev (2010) found that married people were less likely to justify accepting a bribe.

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that married and widowed people were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by separated, divorced, living together as married and single/never married (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that widows were most opposed to bribe taking, followed by married, separated, living together as married, divorced and single/never married (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Marital status was not a significant variable in a study of Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 9a ranks mean scores on the basis of marital status. The divorced group was most opposed to bribe taking; those who were living together were least opposed.

Rank	Status	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Divorced	1.9	1.79	177
2	Married	2.1	1.96	3102
2	Separated	2.1	2.01	121
2	Widowed	2.1	1.90	409
5	Single/Never married	2.2	2.20	3167
6	Living together as married	2.4	2.24	474

Table 9b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference in mean scores between groups is significant at the 5 percent level.

Table 9b					
Marital Status and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	57.336	5	11.467	2.657	0.021
Within Groups	32,131.180	7,444	4.316		
Total	32,188.516	7,449			

Table 9c ranks the mean scores by country and marital status. Married people from Ethiopia were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. South Africans who were living together as married were least opposed.

Table 9c		
RANKING BY COUNTRY & MARITAL STATUS		
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Married	1.3
2	Ethiopia – Single/Never married	1.5
3	South Africa – Divorced	1.7
3	Rwanda – Living together as married	1.7
5	Ghana – Separated	1.9
5	Ghana – Widowed	1.9
5	Ethiopia – Living together as married	1.9
5	Ethiopia – Divorced	1.9

9	Ethiopia – Widowed	2.0
(Continued)		
9	Rwanda – Separated	2.0
11	South Africa – Married	2.1
11	South Africa – Separated	2.1
11	Ghana – Living together as married	2.1
11	Ghana – Divorced	2.1
11	Rwanda – Married	2.1
11	Rwanda – Widowed	2.1
17	South Africa – Widowed	2.2
18	Ethiopia – Separated	2.3
19	Ghana – Single/Never married	2.4
19	Rwanda – Divorced	2.4
21	South Africa – Single/Never married	2.5
21	Rwanda – Single/Never married	2.5
23	Ghana – Married	2.6
24	South Africa – Living together as married	2.7

Education Level

Education level was examined in a number of tax evasion studies. The results of those studies were mixed. Some studies found that the more education a person had, the more opposition there was to tax evasion, while other studies found the exact opposite. A third group of studies found that those in the middle education category had the strongest opposition to tax evasion, while a fourth group of studies found no correlation between education level and the extent of opposition to tax evasion (McGee, 2012d).

Torgler and Valev (2010) found that the more education a person had, the less justification there was for bribery. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that the two groups most opposed to bribe taking were the most educated and the least educated groups (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that the differences in categories were significant but that there was no discernible trend (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Education was not a significant variable for an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 10a ranks the mean scores by level of education. Those with university degrees were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. Those with incomplete secondary education were least opposed. However, the relationship between level of education and attitude toward bribe taking was not linear.

Table 10a				
RANKING BY HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Level	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate	1.8	1.82	270
2	Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification	2.0	1.91	587
2	Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification	2.0	2.09	995
4	Complete secondary: university-	2.1	1.92	865

	preparatory type/Full secondary, maturity level certificate				
5	No formal education	2.2	2.13	950	
5	Inadequately completed elementary education	2.2	2.14	1085	
5	Completed (compulsory) elementary education	2.2	1.98	1246	
8	Incomplete secondary: university- preparatory type/Secondary, intermediate general qualification	2.4	2.30	1262	

Table 10b shows the ANOVA p value, which is significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 10b					
Level of Education and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	156.406	7	22.344	5.164	<0.001
Within Groups	31,377.156	7,252	4.327		
Total	31,533.562	7,259			

Employment Status

A study of eight Western European countries (Torgler & Valev, 2010) found that self-employed individuals had more opportunities to bribe government officials. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that retired people

were most opposed to bribe taking, followed by the self-employed, full-time and part-time workers, housewives, students and the unemployed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that housewives were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, while students and the unemployed were least opposed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). An Egyptian study found that retired and fully-employed people were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, while the unemployed and students were least opposed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 11a ranks the mean scores based on employment status. Those in the *Other* category were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. Part-time workers were least opposed.

Table 11a				
RANKING BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Status	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Other	1.1	0.51	7
2	Housewife	1.8	1.60	414
3	Self employed	2.1	1.95	1734
3	Retired	2.1	2.10	418
5	Full time	2.2	2.05	1477
5	Students	2.2	2.26	1044
5	Unemployed	2.2	2.24	1585
8	Part Time	2.3	2.10	374

Table 11b shows the ANOVA p value, which is significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 11b					
Employment Status and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	82.492	7	11.785	2.712	0.008
Within Groups	30,610.468	7,045	4.345		
Total	30,692.960	7,052			

Institution of Occupation

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that people who worked in the government sector were most opposed to bribe taking, followed by the self-employed, people who worked in the nonprofit sector and those who worked for private firms (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). Institution of occupation was not a significant variable for a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) or for a study of Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 12a ranks the mean scores based on institution of occupation. Those who worked in public institutions were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. Those who worked for private non-profit organizations were least opposed.

Table 12a				
RANKING INSTITUTION OF OCCUPATION				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Institution	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Public institution	2.0	1.88	716
2	Private business	2.2	2.01	3137
3	Private non-profit organization	2.6	2.39	369

Table 12b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups is significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 12b					
Institution of Occupation and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	87.675	2	43.838	10.692	<0.001
Within Groups	17,298.902	4,219	4.100		
Total	17,386.578	4,221			

Table 12c ranks the mean scores by country and institution of occupation. The three Ethiopian groups were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. Those who worked for South African private non-profit organizations were least opposed.

Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Private non-profit organization	1.3
2	Ethiopia – Public institution	1.6
2	Ethiopia – Private business	1.6
4	Ghana – Private non-profit organization	1.9
5	Rwanda – Public institution	2.0
6	South Africa – Public institution	2.1
7	Ghana – Public institution	2.2
7	Rwanda – Private business	2.2
7	Rwanda – Private non-profit organization	2.2
10	South Africa – Private business	2.3
11	Ghana – Private business	2.4
12	South Africa – Private non-profit organization	3.1

Social Class

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that the upper middle class was most opposed to bribe taking, followed by the lower middle class, the working class, the lower class and the upper class (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found the

relationship between class and attitude toward bribe taking to be curvilinear. Those in the middle class had mean scores that were between those of the working class and the lower class (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Social class was not a significant variable for an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 13a ranks mean scores by social class. Those in the working class were most opposed to bribe taking, while those in the lower class were least opposed. Those in the upper class and upper middle class were in the middle.

Rank	Class	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Working class	2.0	1.88	1480
2	Lower middle class	2.1	2.11	1657
3	Upper class	2.2	2.29	141
3	Upper middle class	2.2	2.17	759
5	Lower class	2.3	2.15	3059

Table 13b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups is significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	102.939	4	25.735	5.879	<0.001
Within Groups	31,039.180	7,091	4.377		
Total	31,142.120	7,095			

Table 13c ranks mean scores by country and social class. Ethiopians tended to be more opposed to bribe taking than other groups, in general, while those from Ghana tended to be less opposed. One interesting comparison was that the Ethiopian upper class and the lower class from Ghana had identical mean scores.

Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Lower middle class	1.3
2	Ethiopia – Working class	1.4
3	Rwanda – Upper class	1.5
4	Ethiopia – Upper middle class	1.6
4	Ethiopia – Lower class	1.6
6	Ghana – Upper class	1.7
7	South Africa – Working class	2.1
8	South Africa – Upper middle class	2.2
8	Ghana – Working class	2.2
8	Rwanda – Upper middle	2.2

	class	
8	Rwanda – Lower class	2.2
12	South Africa – Upper class	2.3
12	South Africa – Lower middle class	2.3
12	Ghana – Lower class	2.3
12	Ethiopia – Upper class	2.3
16	Rwanda – Lower middle class	2.4
17	Rwanda – Working class	2.5
18	South Africa – Lower class	2.6
19	Ghana – Lower middle class	2.7
20	Ghana – Upper middle class	3.0

Income

Income level was found not to be a significant variable in a comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) or in a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). An Egyptian study found that those in the lower income category were more opposed to bribe taking than were those in the middle and upper income groups. However, the difference was significant only at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 14a ranks mean scores by income level. Those in the middle income range were more opposed to bribe taking than those in the other two income groups. Those in the highest income group were least opposed.

Rank	Scale	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Middle income	2.0	1.91	3688
2	Low income	2.3	2.19	2639
3	High income	2.5	2.50	730

Table 14b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups was significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	230.417	2	115.209	26.507	<0.001
Within Groups	30,658.907	7,054	4.346		
Total	30,889.324	7,056			

Table 14c ranks mean scores on the basis of country and income level. The three Ethiopian groups were the three groups most opposed to bribe taking. Rwandans in the high income group were least opposed. An ANOVA found the difference between groups to be significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 14c
RANKING BY COUNTRY & SCALE OF INCOME
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)

Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Middle income	1.4
2	Ethiopia – Low income	1.5
3	Ethiopia – High income	1.8
4	Rwanda – Low income	2.0
5	Ghana – Middle income	2.2
6	South Africa – Middle income	2.3
7	Ghana – High income	2.4
7	Rwanda – Middle income	2.4
9	South Africa – Low income	2.5
10	South Africa – High income	2.7
10	Ghana – Low income	2.7
12	Rwanda – High income	3.9

Size of Town

Comparative studies of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) found that people who lived in small towns were generally more opposed to bribe taking than were people who lived in larger towns, although there were some exceptions. An Egyptian study found that people who live in large cities were more opposed to bribe taking than were people who lived in smaller towns (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 15a ranks mean scores by size of town. Those who lived in towns of 5-10,000 population were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who lived in cities of 2-5,000 or 20-50,000 were least opposed. Although the mean scores were significantly different, there was no clear pattern.

Rank	Size	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	5,000-10,000	1.5	0.71	2
2	100,000-500,000	1.7	1.78	1333
3	<2,000	1.8	1.29	93
4	10,000-20,000	2.0	1.61	52
5	50,000-100,000	2.1	1.65	1749
6	>500,000	2.3	2.41	297
7	2,000-5,000	2.4	2.52	759
7	20,000-50,000	2.4	2.31	218

Table 15b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups was significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 15b					
Size of Town and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	312.435	7	44.634	11.832	<0.001
Within Groups	16,955.772	4,495	3.772		
Total	17,268.206	4,502			

Happiness

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that those who were very happy and quite happy were more opposed to bribe taking than were those who were not happy at all (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). Happiness was not a significant variable for a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) or for an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 16a ranks the mean scores based on happiness. Those who were not very happy were slightly more opposed to bribe taking than were those in the other three groups.

Table 16a				
RANKING BY HAPPINESS				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Happiness	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Not very happy	2.1	2.11	1361
2	Very happy	2.2	2.14	2643
2	Quite happy	2.2	2.01	3070
2	Not at all happy	2.2	2.12	354

Table 16b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference in mean score between groups was not significant. In other words, happiness was not a significant variable.

Table 16b					
Happiness and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	11.116	3	3.705	0.856	0.463
Within Groups	32,139.749	7,424	4.329		
Total	32,150.866	7,427			

Table 16c ranks the mean scores on the basis of country and degree of happiness. The mean scores diverge more sharply when the data are disaggregated. Ethiopians in all categories tend to be

more opposed to bribe taking than those in most other groups. Unhappy people from Ghana tend to be least opposed.

Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Very happy	1.4
1	Ethiopia – Not very happy	1.4
3	Ethiopia – Quite happy	1.5
4	Rwanda – Not at all happy	1.8
5	Ethiopia – Not at all happy	1.9
6	South Africa – Not very happy	2.2
6	Ghana – Very happy	2.2
6	Rwanda – Quite happy	2.2
6	Rwanda – Not very happy	2.2
10	South Africa – Not at all happy	2.3
10	Ghana – Quite happy	2.3
12	South Africa – Very happy	2.4
12	Rwanda – Very happy	2.4
14	South Africa – Quite happy	2.5
14	Ghana – Not at all happy	2.5
16	Ghana – Not very happy	3.1

Health

Health was not a significant variable for a comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) or in a study of Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia

found that healthier people were less averse to bribe taking than were unhealthy people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 17a ranks mean scores on the basis of health. Those in very good health were somewhat less opposed to bribe taking than were the other groups. The *very poor* category only applied to South Africa.

Rank	Health	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Fair	2.1	1.90	1750
1	Poor	2.1	1.88	648
1	Very poor	2.1	2.33	44
4	Very good	2.2	2.30	2174
4	Good	2.2	2.05	2817

Table 17c shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups was not significant. In other words, health was not a significant variable.

Table 17b					
Health and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	16.397	4	4.099	0.947	0.436
Within Groups	32,163.500	7,428	4.330		
Total	32,179.897	7,432			

Table 17c ranks the mean scores by country and health status. The mean scores diverse more widely when the data are disaggregated. The four Ethiopian groups were most opposed to bribe taking, while three of the four Ghana groups were least opposed.

Table 17c		
RANKING BY COUNTRY & HEALTH		
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Very good	1.4
1	Ethiopia – Poor	1.4
3	Ethiopia – Good	1.5
4	Ethiopia – Fair	1.6
5	South Africa – Very poor	2.1
5	Rwanda – Very good	2.1
7	South Africa – Fair	2.2
7	Ghana – Poor	2.2
7	Rwanda – Fair	2.2
7	Rwanda – Poor	2.2
11	South Africa – Poor	2.3
11	Rwanda – Good	2.3
13	South Africa – Very good	2.4

13	South Africa – Good	2.4
13	Ghana – Good	2.4
16	Ghana – Very good	2.5
16	Ghana – Fair	2.5

Confidence in the Police

In a comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China, the two groups that had the most confidence in the police also had the strongest opposition to bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that those who placed no confidence in the police were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who placed quite a lot of confidence or a great deal of confidence in the police were least opposed to bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 18a ranks mean scores by extent of confidence in the police. The relationship between extent of confidence and mean score is linear. Those who had no confidence at all in the police were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who had a great deal of confidence in the police were least opposed to bribe taking.

Rank	Confidence	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	None at all	2.0	2.04	924
2	Not very much	2.1	2.03	2021
3	Quite a lot	2.2	2.13	2644
4	A great deal	2.4	2.11	1681

Table 18b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups was significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 18b					
Confidence in the Police and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe					
ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	124.056	3	41.352	9.498	<0.001
Within Groups	31,635.930	7,266	4.354		
Total	31,759.986	7,269			

Confidence in the Justice System

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that those who had the most confidence in the justice system were more opposed to bribe taking than were those with no confidence at all (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that opposition to bribe taking was higher for the groups who placed little or no confidence in the justice system and lower for those who placed confidence in the system (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 19a ranks the mean scores on the basis of extent of confidence in the justice system. The relationship between mean score and extent of confidence in the justice system was mostly linear. Those who had no confidence at all in the justice system were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who placed more confidence in the justice system were less opposed to bribe taking.

Rank	Confidence	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	None at all	1.7	1.65	762
2	Not very much	2.1	2.10	2053
3	A great deal	2.3	2.10	1681
3	Quite a lot	2.3	2.14	2686

Table 19b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups is significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	251.584	3	83.861	19.527	<0.001
Within Groups	30,826.169	7,178	4.295		
Total	31,077.752	7,181			

Confidence in the government

Confidence in the government was not a significant variable in a comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and in a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 20a ranks the mean scores based on the extent of confidence in the government. The relationship is linear. Those who place no confidence in the government are most opposed to bribe taking, while those with a great deal of confidence in the government are least opposed to bribe taking.

Rank	Confidence	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	None at all	1.7	1.77	656
2	Not very much	1.9	1.86	1618
3	Quite a lot	2.3	2.23	2046
4	A great deal	2.5	2.43	1424

Table 20b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups is significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	452.499	3	150.833	33.022	<0.001
Within Groups	26,218.476	5,740	4.568		
Total	26,670.975	5,743			

Left-right political spectrum

Position on the left-right political spectrum was not a significant variable in a comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) or in a study of Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that centrists were most opposed to bribe taking and leftists were least opposed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 21a ranks the mean scores based on position on the left-right political spectrum. The relationship between mean score and position is linear. Those on the left are most opposed to bribe taking, while those on the right are least opposed.

Rank	Spectrum	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Left	2.0	1.76	652
2	Center	2.1	2.03	2894
3	Right	2.4	2.41	1960

Table 21b shows the ANOVA p value. The difference between groups is significant at the 1 percent level.

	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	133.280	2	66.640	14.485	<0.001
Within Groups	25,316.369	5,503	4.600		
Total	25,449.649	5,505			

Table 21c ranks mean scores on the basis of country and position of the political spectrum. The three Ethiopian groups were more opposed to bribe taking than any of the other groups. Those on the South African right were least opposed.

Table 21c		
RANKING BY COUNTRY & LEFT-RIGHT		
POLITICAL SPECTRUM		
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Ethiopia – Right	1.4
2	Ethiopia – Center	1.5
3	Ethiopia – Left	1.6
4	South Africa – Left	1.8
5	South Africa – Center	2.2
5	Ghana – Left	2.2
7	Rwanda – Left	2.3
8	Rwanda – Center	2.4
8	Rwanda – Right	2.4
10	Ghana – Right	2.5
11	Ghana – Center	2.7
12	South Africa – Right	2.9

Summary of Findings

Table 22 summarizes the findings.

Table 22
Summary of Findings
<p>Overall – Ethiopia was significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were any of the other countries in the study; Rwanda was significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were South Africa or Ghana. Those in South Africa and Ghana were equally opposed to bribe taking, and were significantly less opposed than respondents in the other two countries.</p> <p>Gender – Overall, females were more opposed to bribe taking.</p> <p>Age – Differences in age were not significant.</p> <p>Ethnicity – The Ethiopian Oromiya group was the most opposed to bribe taking, followed closely by the Ethiopia Amhara group. The black/other black group</p>

was least opposed.

Importance of religion - Those who thought religion was very important were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, while those least opposed thought that religion was not at all important in life. However, the relationship was not strictly linear because those who thought religion was not very important were more opposed to bribe taking than were those who thought religion was rather important.

Religion - Orthodox were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by Protestants, Pentecostals, Roman Catholics, Evangelicals, and the Independent African Church. Muslims were least opposed.

Religiosity – Those who were not religious were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by those who were religious. Atheists were least opposed to bribe taking.

Marital Status – Divorced people were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. Married, separated and widowed tied for second place, followed by single/never married and living together as married.

Education Level - Those with university degrees were most strongly opposed to bribe taking. Those with incomplete secondary education were least opposed. However, the relationship between level of education and attitude toward bribe taking was not linear.

Employment Status – Housewives were most opposed to bribe taking. Self-employed and retired people tied for second place. Full-time employees, students and the unemployed were in the next group. Part-time employees were least opposed to bribe taking.

Institution of Occupation - Those who worked in public institutions were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by those in private business. Those who worked for private non-profit organizations were least opposed.

Social Class - Those in the working class were most opposed to bribe taking, while those in the lower class were least opposed. Those in the upper class and upper middle class were in the middle.

Income Level - Those in the middle income range were more opposed to bribe taking than those in the other two income groups. Those in the highest income group were least opposed.

Size of Town - Those who lived in towns of 5-10,000 population were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who lived in cities of 2-5,000 or 20-50,000 were least opposed. Although the mean scores were significantly different, there was no clear pattern.

Happiness – Differences were not significant.

Health – Differences were not significant.

Confidence in the Police - The relationship between extent of confidence and mean score is linear. Those who had no confidence at all in the police were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who had a great deal of confidence in the police were least opposed to bribe taking.

Confidence In the Justice System - The relationship between mean score and extent of confidence in the justice system was mostly linear. Those who had no confidence at all in the justice system were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who placed more confidence in the justice system were less opposed to bribe taking.

Confidence in the Government - Those who place no confidence in the government are most opposed to bribe taking, while those with a great deal of confidence in the government are least opposed to bribe taking.

Left-right Political Spectrum – The relationship between mean score and position is linear. Those on the left are most opposed to bribe taking, while those on the right are least opposed.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Although all four countries were opposed to bribe taking, some countries were more opposed than others. Most of the demographic variables examined showed significant differences in mean scores.

A number of additional studies could be made on this topic. Attitudes in additional countries could be made and a closer examination of some of the demographic variables could yield

interesting results. More needs to be known about why differences in some demographic variables are significant. Cultural, historical, sociological, psychological and religious factors all play a role. These avenues could benefit from further examination.

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