

THE ETHICAL PERCEPTIONS OF BRIBE TAKING IN FOUR MUSLIM COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

This study examined attitudes toward bribe taking in four Muslim countries – Indonesia, Egypt, Iran and Iraq. Eighteen demographic variables were also examined (gender, age, marital status, etc.), and it was found that most mean scores between groups were significant.

Key Words: bribery, ethics, rent seeking, demographic variables, gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, Muslim, education level, employment status, occupation, social class, income level, size of town, health, happiness, confidence in the police, confidence in the justice system, confidence in government, left-right political spectrum, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Middle East

JEL Codes: D01, D23, D6, D72, D73, E26, I1, I2, I3, J1, J12, J14, J16, K14, K42, O53, O55, O56, O57

INTRODUCTION

One might think that bribery is always unethical. Studies by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2011) discourage the practice and a number of other studies have viewed bribery in negative terms (Bonucci & Moulette, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Darrough, 2010; Moran, 1999; Pacini, Swingen & Rogers, 2002; Scharf, 2008).

However, a closer examination of the issue reveals that the question of whether bribery is ethical or unethical is not so clear-cut in some cases. For example, bribing a prison guard to release a political prisoner who is being held by a corrupt or evil regime might constitute an ethical act (Roy & Singer, 2006). From a utilitarian ethical perspective, bribery would be acceptable in cases where there are more winners than losers.

This paper reviews the ethical literature on bribery and reports the findings of a survey of opinion in four Muslim countries – Indonesia, Egypt, Iran and Iraq.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Many articles and several books have been written about various aspects of bribery. This paper focuses on the ethical literature on the topic. When trying to determine whether bribery is ethical or unethical, a threshold question to ask is which set of ethical principles to apply. Ethicists have several options in their toolkit, and not all ethical systems arrive at the same result in any given situation.

Baron, Pettit and Slote (1997) identify and discuss three of the main ethical systems. Graham (2004) discusses eight ethical systems. Most ethical systems, when analyzed and closely compared, usually fall within the general categories of utilitarianism, rights theory, or virtue ethics, broadly defined.

Virtue ethics goes back to the time of Aristotle (2002), if not before. The main thrust of virtue ethics is that an act or policy

is good if the result is human flourishing. Utilitarian ethics holds that an act or policy is ethical if the result is the greatest good for the greatest number, or if the winners exceed the losers, or if the result is what economists call a positive-sum game (Brandt, 1992; Frey, 1984; Goodin, 1995; McGee, 2012a; Wong & Beckman, 1992). These various utilitarian views are not quite the same, but they are similar. If a policy or act results in human flourishing, it could meet both the virtue ethics test and the utilitarian ethics test.

Within utilitarian ethics is a branch that holds that something that increases efficiency is ethical. Richard Posner (1983, 1998), the American jurist and co-founder of the Law & Economics movement, takes this position. This view has been criticized (McGee, 2012a), but it remains a mainstream utilitarian position.

Rights theory holds that an act is unethical if someone's rights are violated, regardless of whether the winners exceed the losers (Baron, Pettit & Slote, 1997; Brandt, 1992; McGee, 2012a, b & c). One of the main criticisms of utilitarian ethics is that rights are disregarded. Taking a rights approach overcomes this deficiency in utilitarian ethics.

Kantian ethics, named after Immanuel Kant (1952, 1983), focuses on duty. If someone has a duty and breaches that duty, any such act is considered to be unethical. The Kantian view may be applied to bribery in cases where the receiver of the bribe is an agent who has a duty to the principal to do what is in the best interest of the principal. An agent who acts against the best interest of the principal is acting unethically.

Most of the literature on ethical aspects of bribery does not cite philosophers or particular ethical theories, at least not directly. However, much of the literature has an underlying premise that either utilitarian ethics or principles of duty should be applied. Virtue ethics and rights theory also appear in some analyses, although most studies on bribery are done by economists or lawyers, who tend to be utilitarians, at least most of the time.

Logue (2005) believes that bribery is always unethical because it violates absolute moral principles that cannot be compromised. He goes on to say that bribery is basically unfair and results in an inefficient allocation of resources, and frustrates the constructive role of government. Carson (1987) believes that accepting a bribe is always *prima facie* wrong because it violates duties, but makes some exceptions, such as in cases of conscripted soldiers, some prostitutes and others who are held as virtual slaves.

Johnsen (2009, 2010) applies cost-benefit analysis to determine whether paying a bribe results in a positive-sum game. Shaw (1988) points out that benefits and costs may not be easy to determine.

Some scholars assert that bribery may serve a useful function if a bribe acts to grease the wheels of commerce, which makes commerce work more efficiently. Such would be the case where a corrupt government or inefficient bureaucracy can be circumvented by paying someone to cut red tape or otherwise go around the rules. Some scholars take the position that, in general, bribery may be ethical in cases where it is a helping hand, but unethical when it is paid to a grabbing hand who offers nothing in return for the payment (Colombatto, 2003; Egger & Winner, 2005; Houston, 2007; Johnsen, 2009, 2010). Wong and Beckman (1992) developed a point system to determine whether the helping hand or grabbing hand predominates.

Several studies have examined bribery in connection with other forms of corruption, with a focus it has on foreign direct investment (FDI). Cuervo-Cazurra (2006, 2008) and Mauro (1995) found that bribery decreased FDI, whereas Egger and Winner (2005) found that bribery acts to stimulate FDI in cases where it acts as a helping hand. Weitzel and Berns (2006) found that host country corruption is negatively associated with premiums paid in cross-country mergers. Sanyal and Samanta (2010) found that bribery has a negative effect on economic growth.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study utilizes the data gathered in the World Values survey for Indonesia, Egypt, Iran and Iraq. Aggregate data are examined as well as the data for several demographic variables.

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this study were taken from the Human Beliefs and Values (HBV) surveys. Data for these surveys were collected by social scientists all over the world and cover a wide range of issues relating to perceptions of life, environment, work, family, politics and society, religion and morale and national identity. The present study analyzes the data reflecting attitudes on bribery. The question asked whether the respondent believed that accepting a bribe in the course of one's duties was justifiable. Responses were measured on a 10-point Likert scale where 1 is never justifiable and 10 is always justifiable.

Results were compiled overall and some demographic variables were also examined to determine whether differences in belief were significant. The next section reports on the findings.

FINDINGS

The next few paragraphs report the findings of the study.

Overall Results

Table 1 shows the overall results for all four countries. Iraq had the lowest mean score, which indicates the strongest opposition to bribery. Indonesia and Egypt are tied for second place, with Iran showing the least opposition to bribery. However, all four mean scores are less than 2.0 which, on a scale of 1 to 10, show that the people in all four countries are strongly opposed to bribery. It might also be pointed out that between 72.9 percent and

94.4 percent of those surveyed believed that bribery is never justified.

Table 1								
Overall Results								
	Indonesia		Egypt		Iran		Iraq	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Never justifiable 1	1731	87.0%	2698	88.5%	1934	72.9%	2512	94.4%
2	122	6.1%	128	4.2%	332	12.5%	106	4.0%
3	22	1.1%	59	1.9%	134	5.1%	9	0.3%
4	15	0.8%	44	1.4%	47	1.8%	4	0.2%
5	27	1.4%	33	1.1%	60	2.3%	5	0.2%
6	14	0.7%	23	0.8%	30	1.1%	1	0.0%
7	16	0.8%	18	0.6%	29	1.1%	2	0.1%
8	13	0.7%	22	0.7%	28	1.1%	4	0.2%
9	16	0.8%	11	0.4%	21	0.8%	4	0.2%
Always justifiable 10	13	0.7%	12	0.4%	38	1.4%	15	0.6%
Total	1989	100.0%	3048	100.0%	2653	100.0%	2662	100.0%
Mean	1.4		1.4		1.8		1.1	
Standard Deviation	1.43		1.27		1.77		0.86	

Comparison of p-Values

Table 2 shows the p value comparisons. All comparisons except that of Egypt to Indonesia found that the mean scores were significantly different.

Table 2			
Comparison of p Values			
	Egypt	Iran	Iraq
Indonesia	1.0000	<0.001	<0.001
Egypt		<0.001	<0.001
Iran			<0.001

Gender

Gender is one of the most commonly studied demographic variables. Some studies have found that women were more ethical

than men (Beu et al., 2003; Harris, 1990; Schaub, 1994), while other studies have found that men were more ethical than women (Barnett & Karson, 1987; Weeks et al., 1999). A third group of studies found that men and women were equally ethical (Callan, 1992; Luthar et al., 1997; Ondrack, 1973).

Some studies on tax evasion found that women were more opposed to tax evasion (Gupta & McGee, 2010 – New Zealand accounting, business and economics and law students and accounting practitioners; McGee, 2012d – philosophy professors; McGee & Cohn, 2008 – Orthodox Jewish students in New York City). Other studies found that men were more opposed to tax evasion (McGee, 2006 – Romanian business students; McGee & Benk, 2011 – Turkish business and economics students; McGee & Tusan, 2008 – Slovak business and economics, philosophy and theology students). A third group found that men and women were equally opposed to tax evasion (McGee & An, 2008 – Chinese business and economics students; McGee & George, 2008 – Indian graduate business students; McGee, Petrides & Ross, 2012 – Mexican accounting, business and engineering students and faculty).

Gender has been studied in a few other bribery studies. Mocan (2004) found that men are more likely to be asked for a bribe. Torgler and Valev (2010) found that women were less likely to justify accepting a bribe. Comparative studies of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) found that women were significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were men. An Egyptian survey found that men were significantly more opposed to bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 3a shows the total mean scores for all four countries, broken down by gender. The mean scores were identical. The p value shows that the mean scores are not significantly different.

Table 3b ranks the mean scores for male and female participants by country. Iraqi males were most opposed to bribery,

followed by Iraqi females. Iranian males and females were least opposed to bribery.

Table 3a RANKING BY GENDER (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Gender	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Male	1.4	1.41	5206
1	Female	1.4	1.35	5119
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN MEAN SCORES p value Male v. Female 1.0000				
Table 3b RANKING BY COUNTRY & GENDER (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank		Mean		
1	Iraq – Male	1.1		
2	Iraq – Female	1.2		
3	Egypt – Male	1.3		
4	Indonesia - Female	1.4		
4	Egypt – Female	1.4		
6	Indonesia- Male	1.5		
7	Iran - Female	1.7		
8	Iran – Male	1.8		

Age

Age is another demographic factor that is often examined in social science research. Most studies have found that older people are more ethical or have more respect for the law than do younger people (McGee, 2012d; Ruegger & King, 1992), although there have been some exceptions (Babakus et al., 2004; Sims et al., 1996).

One study of corruption found that older people are less likely to justify bribery (Torgler & Valev, 2010). A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that older people were more strongly opposed to bribery than were younger people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that people over 30 were significantly more opposed to bribe taking than were younger people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). An Egyptian study found that the oldest group was somewhat more opposed to bribe taking, but the difference was significant only at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 4a shows the statistics for age. A ranking of mean scores shows that the older the group is, the stronger the opposition to bribery.

Table 4a				
RANKING BY AGE				
(Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Age	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	50+	1.3	1.05	2136
2	30-49	1.4	1.40	4448
3	15-29	1.5	1.52	3759

An ANOVA found that the difference between groups was highly significant. The specifics are shown in Table 4b.

Table 4b Age and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	56.403	2	28.202	14.763	<0.001
Within Groups	19,752.441	10,340	1.910		
Total	19,808.844	10,342			

Table 4c ranks the mean scores by country. The results are interesting. Although the combined data revealed that the older the group is, the stronger opposition there is to bribery, a breakdown by country found that this relationship does not always exist for some countries. For example, the 50+ age group for Iraq were less strongly opposed to bribery than were the other Iraqi groups, and the 30-49 Indonesian group was less opposed to bribery than was the 15-29 age group.

Table 4c RANKING BY COUNTRY & AGE (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Iraq – 15-29	1.1
1	Iraq – 30-49	1.1
3	Iraq – 50+	1.2
4	Indonesia – 50+	1.3
4	Egypt – 50+	1.3
6	Indonesia – 15-29	1.4
6	Egypt – 15-29	1.4
6	Egypt – 30-49	1.4
6	Iran – 50+	1.4
10	Indonesia – 30-49	1.5
11	Iran – 30-49	1.7
12	Iran – 15-29	1.8

Ethnicity

A few prior studies of bribery have examined ethnicity. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that whites were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by East Asians, Hispanics, half-breed black/white and blacks (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that Caucasians were most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by half breed black/white, and black (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 5a ranks mean scores by ethnicity. Central Asian (Arabic) participants were most opposed to bribery, followed by Javanese and Kurd/Esid. Those least opposed were three Iranian ethnic groups.

Table 5a RANKING BY ETHNICITY (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Ethnicity	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Asian -Central(Arabic)	1.1	0.81	2318
2	Javanese	1.3	1.23	1247
2	Kurd/Esid	1.3	1.19	544
4	Sundanese	1.7	1.93	494
4	Turkish	1.7	1.72	590
6	Iranian: Fars	1.8	1.76	1518
6	Iranian: Gilak	1.8	1.86	119
8	Iranian: Lur	1.9	1.71	138

Table 5b shows the ANOVA, which was highly significant.

Table 5b Ethnicity and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	616.140	7	88.020	46.197	<0.001
Within Groups	13,260.966	6,960	1.905		
Total	13,877.106	6,967			

Importance of Religion in Life

A few prior studies have examined the relationship between the importance of religion in life and attitude toward bribe taking. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that those at both ends of the spectrum had the most opposition to bribery, while those in the middle had less opposition (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a).

A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that those who did not hold religion very important in life were slightly more opposed to bribe taking than those who held religion to be important. However, the difference was significant only at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). The importance of religion in life was found not to be a significant variable in an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 6a ranks mean scores based on the importance of religion in life. One might assume that those for whom religion is

most important would be more opposed to bribery than those who do not view religion as important. The ranking supports this view.

Table 6a RANKING BY IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Importance	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Very important	1.4	1.33	9418
2	Rather Important	1.8	1.78	722
3	Not very important	1.9	2.01	132
3	Not at all important	1.9	2.09	54

Table 6b shows the ANOVA p value, which is significant.

Table 6b Importance of Religion in Life and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	147.903	3	49.301	25.828	<0.001
Within Groups	19,702.910	10,322	1.909		
Total	9,850.813	10,325			

Religious Person

Table 7a ranks mean scores based on degree of religiosity.

Table 7a RANKING BY RELIGIOUS PERSON (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Religious	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	A religious person	1.4	1.33	7839
1	A convinced atheist	1.4	1.58	74
3	Not a religious person	1.5	1.45	1987

Table 7b shows the ANOVA calculation. Those who were not religious were significantly less opposed to bribery than were those in the other two groups.

Table 7b Religious Person and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	15.882	2	7.941	4.313	0.013
Within Groups	18,222.440	9,897	1.841		
Total	18,238.322	9,899			

Marital Status

Several prior ethical studies have examined marital status. The relationship between marital status and views toward tax evasion has been mixed (McGee, 2012d). For bribery studies, Torgler and Valev (2010) found that married people were less likely to justify accepting a bribe. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that married and widowed people were the most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by separated, divorced, living together as married and single/never married people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a).

A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that widowed people were most opposed to bribe taking, followed by married, separated, living together as married, divorced and single/never married people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Marital status was not a significant variable in Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 8a ranks mean scores on the basis of marital status. Widows were most opposed to bribery, followed by those living together as married and divorced, married, single/never married and separated.

Table 8a RANKING BY MARITAL STATUS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Status	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Widowed	1.2	1.08	568
2	Living together as married	1.3	1.11	883
2	Divorced	1.3	1.35	82
4	Married	1.4	1.38	6261
5	Single/Never married	1.5	1.53	2507
6	Separated	1.6	1.71	43

Table 8b shows the ANOVA calculation. The difference in mean score between groups was highly significant.

Table 8b Marital Status and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	58.926	5	11.785	6.151	<0.001
Within Groups	19,806.335	10,338	1.916		
Total	19,865.261	10,343			

Table 8c ranks mean scores by country and marital status. The various Iraqi groups tend to be least tolerant of bribery, whereas the various Iranian categories tend to be most tolerant. Note: there was no “living together as married” category for Iraq and Egypt.

Table 8c RANKING BY COUNTRY & MARITAL STATUS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Indonesia- Separated	1.0
1	Iraq – Divorced	1.0
1	Iraq – Separated	1.0
4	Iraq – Married	1.1
4	Iraq – Single/Never married	1.1
6	Indonesia – Widowed	1.2
6	Iran – Divorced	1.2
6	Iraq – Widowed	1.2
9	Indonesia – Living together as married	1.3
9	Egypt - Divorced	1.3
9	Egypt – Separated	1.3
9	Egypt – Widowed	1.3
9	Iran –Widowed	1.3
14	Indonesia – Single/Never married	1.4
14	Egypt – Married	1.4
14	Egypt – Single/Never married	1.4
14	Iran – Living together as married	1.4
18	Indonesia – Married	1.7
18	Iran – Married	1.7
20	Indonesia – Divorced	1.9
20	Iran – Single/Never married	1.9
22	Iran – Separated	2.7

Highest Level of Education Attained

Some prior bribery studies have examined the relationship between education level and attitude toward bribe taking. Torgler and Valev (2010) found that the more education respondents had, the less likely they were to justify bribery. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that the two groups most opposed to bribe taking were the most educated and the least educated group (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that, although differences in education level were significant, there was no clear trend (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Education level was not a significant variable in an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 9a ranks mean scores on the basis of education level. There seems to be no clear pattern. Those with no formal education and those with a university education tied for being most opposed to bribery, which might make the relationship appear to be curvilinear. However, the other rankings do not support this conclusion.

Table 9a RANKING BY HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Level	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	No formal education	1.3	1.25	1446
1	University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate	1.3	1.22	1755
3	Inadequately completed elementary education	1.4	1.35	916
3	Complete secondary: university-	1.4	1.33	2274

	preparatory type/Full secondary, maturity level certificate			
5	Completed (compulsory) elementary education	1.5	1.41	1534
5	Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification	1.5	1.57	451
5	Incomplete secondary: university- preparatory type/Secondary, intermediate general qualification	1.5	1.51	664
8	Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification	1.6	1.76	846

Table 9c shows the ANOVA calculation. The differences between groups are highly significant.

Table 9b Level of Education and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	91.025	7	13.004	6.817	<0.001
Within Groups	18,842.904	9,878	1.908		
Total	8,933.929	9,885			

Employment Status

A few prior studies have examined employment status in connection with attitudes toward bribery. Torgler and Valev (2010) found that self-employed individuals had more opportunity to bribe government officials. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that retired people were most opposed to bribe taking, followed by the self-employed, full-time and part-time workers, housewives, students and the unemployed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that housewives were most opposed to bribe taking, and that students and the unemployed were least opposed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). An Egyptian study found that retired and fully-employed individuals were most opposed to bribe taking, while the unemployed and students were least opposed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 10a ranks mean scores based on employment status. Full-time employees, retired and *other* were most strongly opposed to bribery. Those who were unemployed were least opposed. Part-timers and the self-employed were only slightly less opposed.

Table 10a RANKING BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Status	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Full time	1.3	1.28	2808
1	Retired	1.3	0.96	470
1	Other	1.3	1.08	155
4	Housewife	1.4	1.31	3326
4	Students	1.4	1.37	759
6	Part Time	1.5	1.55	644
6	Self employed	1.5	1.57	1150
8	Unemployed	1.6	1.62	980

Table 10 b shows the ANOVA p value, which was highly significant.

Table 10b Employment Status and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	91.370	7	13.053	6.960	<0.001
Within Groups	19,285.833	10,284	1.875		
Total	19,377.203	10,291			

Institution of Occupation

A few prior studies have examined institution of occupation in connection with studies on bribe taking. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that people who work in the government sector were most opposed to bribe taking, followed by the self-employed, people who worked at private, non-profit institutions and those who worked for private firms (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that those who worked in the private and public sectors had similar views on bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). This demographic variable was found not to be significant in an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 11a ranks mean scores based on type of employment institution. Those who worked at public institutions tended to be most opposed to bribery, while those at private nonprofit institutions tended to be least opposed.

Table 11a RANKING INSTITUTION OF OCCUPATION (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Institution	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Public institution	1.4	1.32	1113
2	Private business	1.5	1.54	2006
3	Private non-profit organization	1.8	1.93	95

Table 11b shows the ANOVA p value, which was highly significant.

Table 11b Institution of Occupation and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	17.547	2	8.773	4.000	0.018
Within Groups	7,042.747	3,211	2.193		
Total	7,060.294	3,213			

Table 11c ranks the various categories by country. Indonesians who work in private nonprofit organizations were most opposed to bribery, while Iranians who worked for private nonprofit organizations were least opposed. Note: The Iraqi sample did not include data for this variable.

Table 11c RANKING BY COUNTRY & INSTITUTION OF OCCUPATION (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Indonesia – Private non-profit organization	1.2
2	Indonesia – Public institution	1.3
2	Egypt – Public institution	1.3
4	Indonesia – Private business	1.4
4	Egypt – Private business	1.4
6	Egypt – Private non-profit organization	1.5

7	Iran – Public institution	1.6
8	Iran – Private business	1.8
9	Iran – Private non-profit organization	2.2

Social Class

A few prior studies have examined social class in connection with attitudes toward bribery. Torgler and Valev (2010) found that the higher the economic class, the less justifiable it was to accept a bribe. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that the upper class was most strongly opposed to bribe taking, followed by the lower middle class, the working class, the lower class and the upper class (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a).

A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found a curvilinear relationship, where those in the middle class had mean scores that were between the working class and the lower class (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b). Social class was found not to be a significant variable in an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 12a ranks mean scores by social class. Those in the working class were most opposed to bribery, while those in the upper class were least opposed. The relationship was mostly linear.

Table 12a RANKING BY SOCIAL CLASS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Class	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Working class	1.2	1.03	1817
2	Lower middle class	1.4	1.42	4532
2	Lower class	1.4	1.36	1605
4	Upper middle class	1.5	1.52	2072
5	Upper class	1.6	1.56	73

Table 12b shows the ANOVA p value, which was highly significant.

Table 12b Social Class and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	94.335	4	23.584	12.536	<0.001
Within Groups	18,989.719	10,094	1.881		
Total	19,084.053	10,098			

Table 12c ranks mean scores by country and social class. The Egyptian and Iraqi upper class were most opposed to bribery, while the Indonesian upper class was far less opposed. The Iranian lower class was least opposed. In general, the country one came from had more of an influence on opinion than did class. The various Iraqi groups tended to

have the lowest mean scores, whereas Iranian groups tended to have to highest mean scores.

Table 12c RANKING BY COUNTRY & SOCIAL CLASS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Egypt – Upper class	1.0
1	Iraq – Upper class	1.0
3	Iraq – Upper middle class	1.1
3	Iraq – Working class	1.1
3	Iraq – Lower class	1.1
6	Iraq – Lower middle class	1.2
7	Indonesia – Upper middle class	1.3
7	Indonesia – Lower class	1.3
7	Egypt – Working class	1.3
10	Indonesia – Lower middle class	1.4
10	Egypt – Upper middle class	1.4
10	Egypt – Lower middle class	1.4
10	Egypt – Lower class	1.4
14	Indonesia – Upper class	1.5
15	Indonesia – Working class	1.7
15	Iran – Lower middle class	1.7
17	Iran – Upper middle class	1.8
17	Iran – Lower class	1.8

Income Level

A few prior studies have examined income level in connection with attitudes toward taking bribes. Torgler and Valev (2010) found that individuals with higher incomes are more likely to be asked for a bribe. An Egyptian study found that those in the

lower income category were more opposed to bribe taking than were individuals in the middle and upper income groups, although the difference was significant only at the 10 percent level (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c). Income was found not to be a significant variable in a comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and also in a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 13a ranks mean scores based on income level. Those in the low and middle income categories had identical mean scores, while those in the high income group had the highest mean score, indicating the least opposition to bribery.

Table 13a RANKING BY SCALE OF INCOME (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Scale	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Low income	1.4	1.30	3156
1	Middle income	1.4	1.40	6256
3	High income	1.6	1.57	604

Table 13b shows the ANOVA p value, which was highly significant.

Table 13b Scale of income and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	22.703	2	11.352	5.958	0.003
Within Groups	19,078.085	10,013	1.905		
Total	19,100.788	10,015			

Table 13c ranks mean scores by country and income level. The three Iraqi categories all had the same mean score, which was also the lowest score of any group. The Egyptian and Indonesian scores were more or less the same, regardless of income groups. The three highest mean scores were from the Iranian groups. From this distribution, one might conclude that country played a more important role than income.

Table 13c RANKING BY COUNTRY & SCALE OF INCOME (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Iraq – Low income	1.1
1	Iraq – Middle income	1.1
1	Iraq – High income	1.1
4	Egypt – Low income	1.3
5	Indonesia – Low income	1.4
5	Indonesia – Middle income	1.4
5	Indonesia – High income	1.4
5	Egypt – Middle income	1.4
5	Egypt – High income	1.4
10	Iran – Low income	1.7
10	Iran – Middle income	1.7
12	Iran – High income	1.9

Size of Town

Comparative studies of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) found that, in general, people who live in small towns were more opposed to bribe taking than were people who lived in larger towns. A study of Egypt found just the opposite result, that people who live in big cities tend to be more strongly opposed to bribe taking than people in smaller towns (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c).

Table 14a ranks mean scores by the size of the town where respondents lived. From the distribution, it was difficult to conclude that the relationship was linear because the results were scattered, although one might say that those who lived in larger cities tended to be less opposed to bribery than were other groups.

Table 14a RANKING BY SIZE OF TOWN (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Size	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	5,000-10,000	1.4	1.24	773
1	20,000-50,000	1.4	1.29	446
3	<2,000	1.5	1.48	699
3	10,000-20,000	1.5	1.45	545
3	50,000-100,000	1.5	1.53	355
6	2,000-5,000	1.6	1.60	785
6	>500,000	1.6	1.59	2326
8	100,000-500,000	1.7	1.75	751

Table 14b shows the ANOVA p value, which shows this variable was highly significant.

Table 14b Size of Town and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	56.096	7	8.014	3.425	0.001
Within Groups	15,610.637	6,672	2.340		
Total	15,666.733	6,679			

Happiness

Prior studies that examined happiness in connection with attitude toward bribe taking reached differing results. A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that those in the two happiest categories were more strongly opposed to bribe taking than those in the other two categories (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a), while an Egyptian study (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c) and a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b) found that happiness was not a significant variable..

Table 15a ranks mean scores on the basis of relative happiness. Those who were not at all happy were most strongly opposed to bribery, while those who were very happy were least opposed.

Table 15a RANKING BY HAPPINESS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Happiness	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Not at all happy	1.3	1.23	650
2	Quite happy	1.4	1.37	6421
2	Not very happy	1.4	1.36	1726
4	Very happy	1.5	1.51	1444

Table 15b shows the ANOVA p value, which indicates the happiness variable his highly significant.

Table 15b Happiness and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	20.324	3	6.775	3.554	0.014
Within Groups	19,512.314	10,237	1.906		
Total	9,532.639	10,240			

Table 15c ranks mean scores by country and degree of happiness. The various Iraqi groups tended to be most opposed to bribery regardless of degree of happiness, whereas the Iranian groups tended to be least opposed, regardless of extent of happiness, leading one to conclude that country played a more important role in opinion than did degree of happiness.

Table 15c RANKING BY COUNTRY & HAPPINESS (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Iraq – Very happy	1.1
1	Iraq – Quite happy	1.1
1	Iraq – Not very happy	1.1
1	Iraq – Not at all happy	1.1
5	Egypt – Not at all happy	1.2
6	Indonesia – Quite happy	1.3
6	Egypt – Quite happy	1.3
8	Egypt – Not very happy	1.4
9	Indonesia – Not at all happy	1.5
9	Egypt – Very happy	1.5
9	Iran – Very happy	1.5
12	Indonesia – Very happy	1.6
12	Indonesia – Not very happy	1.6
14	Iran – Quite happy	1.8
14	Iran – Not very happy	1.8
16	Iran – Not at all happy	2.0

Health

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a) and a study of Egypt (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c) found that health was not a

significant variable. A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that healthier people were less averse to bribe taking than were unhealthy people (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 16a ranks mean scores on the basis of health. Those in poor health tended to be most opposed to bribery, whereas those in the other three categories tended to be equally and less opposed to bribery.

Table 16a RANKING BY HEALTH (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Health	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Poor	1.3	1.30	775
2	Very good	1.4	1.38	1820
2	Good	1.4	1.41	5247
2	Fair	1.4	1.34	2439

Table 16b shows the ANOVA p value, which indicates that health is not a significant variable.

Table 16b Health and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	7.166	3	2.389	1.254	0.288
Within Groups	19,579.409	10,277	1.905		
Total	19,586.575	10,280			

Table 16c ranks mean scores by country and health category. Again, the Iraqi samples tend to be most opposed to bribery, whereas the Iranian groups tend to be least opposed, leading one to conclude that country is a more important variable than health status.

Table 16c RANKING BY COUNTRY & HEALTH (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Indonesia – Poor	1.1
1	Iraq – Good	1.1
1	Iraq – Fair	1.1
4	Iraq – Very good	1.2
4	Iraq – Poor	1.2
6	Egypt – Fair	1.3
6	Egypt – Poor	1.3
8	Indonesia – Very good	1.4
8	Indonesia – Good	1.4
8	Egypt – Very good	1.4
8	Egypt – Good	1.4
12	Indonesia – Fair	1.5
13	Iran – Very good	1.7
13	Iran – Fair	1.7
15	Iran – Good	1.8
15	Iran – Poor	1.8

Confidence in the Police

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that the two groups who had the most confidence in the police also had the strongest opposition to bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that those who place no confidence in the police were most opposed to bribe taking, while those who place quite a lot of confidence or a great deal of confidence in the

police were least opposed to bribe taking (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 17a ranks mean scores based on the extent of confidence in the police. Three of the four categories had identical mean scores for this variable. Those who placed no confidence at all in the police tended to be least opposed to bribery.

Table 17a RANKING BY CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICE (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Confidence	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	A great deal	1.6	1.75	728
1	Quite a lot	1.6	1.55	1736
1	Not very much	1.6	1.63	1813
4	None at all	1.7	1.84	316

Table 17c shows the ANOVA p value, which indicates the difference in mean scores between groups is not significant. Thus, confidence in the police is not a significant variable.

Table 17b Confidence in the Police and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	2.943	3	0.981	0.367	0.777
Within Groups	12,275.542	4,589	2.675		
Total	12,278.484	4,592			

Confidence in the Justice System

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that those with the most confidence in the justice system were more opposed to bribe taking than were those with no confidence at all (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that opposition to bribe taking was higher for the groups that placed little or no confidence in the justice system, and lower for those who placed confidence in the system (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 18a ranks mean scores based on the extent of confidence in the justice system. As was the case with the confidence in the police variable, three of the four categories had identical means, whereas the category of *none at all* had the highest mean score, indicating the least amount of confidence.

Table 18a RANKING BY CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Confidence	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	A great deal	1.6	1.65	582
1	Quite a lot	1.6	1.56	1546
1	Not very much	1.6	1.62	2093
4	None at all	1.7	1.87	321

Table 18a shows the ANOVA p value, which indicates that the extent of confidence in the justice system was not a significant variable.

Table 18b Confidence in the Justice System and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	2.983	3	0.994	0.378	0.769
Within Groups	11,950.937	4,538	2.634		
Total	11,953.920	4,541			

Confidence in the Government

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and Asia found that confidence in the government was not a significant variable (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia reached the same result (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 19a ranks mean scores based on extent of confidence in the government. Those who had a great deal of confidence in the government tended to have the strongest opposition to bribery, whereas those with not very much confidence in the government had the least opposition to bribery. The relationship was not totally linear, however, because those who had no confidence at all in the government were somewhat more strongly opposed to bribery than were those who fell into the *not very much* category.

Table 19a RANKING BY CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Confidence	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	A great deal	1.3	1.19	1443
2	Quite a lot	1.4	1.40	2428
2	None at all	1.4	1.42	854
4	Not very much	1.5	1.55	2304

Table 19b shows the ANOVA p value, which indicates that confidence in the government is a highly significant variable.

Table 19b Confidence in the Government and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	36.415	3	12.138	6.068	<0.001
Within Groups	14,051.883	7,025	2.000		
Total	14,088.298	7,028			

Left-right political spectrum

A comparative study of the USA, Brazil, Germany and China found that position on the left-right political spectrum was not a significant variable when it came to attitude toward accepting a bribe (Hernandez & McGee, 2012a). A similar result was reached

in a study of Egyptian opinion (Hernandez & McGee, 2012c). However, a comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia found that centrists were most opposed to bribe taking, while leftists were least opposed (Hernandez & McGee, 2012b).

Table 20a ranks attitude toward bribery based on position in the left-right political spectrum. Interestingly, those on the right and those on the left had identical mean scores, and were most opposed to bribery, whereas those in the center were least opposed. Thus, the distribution is curvilinear.

Table 20a RANKING BY LEFT-RIGHT POLITICAL SPECTRUM (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)				
Rank	Spectrum	Mean	Std. Dev.	n
1	Left	1.2	1.10	2011
1	Right	1.2	1.05	1314
3	Center	1.3	1.27	3188

Table 20b shows the ANOVA p value, which indicates that position on the left-right political spectrum is a highly significant variable.

Table 20b Left-right Political Spectrum and Attitudes toward Accepting a Bribe ANOVA Analysis					
	Σ Squares	Df	Mean Squares	Fisher F-value	p value
Between Groups	16.275	2	8.138	5.873	0.003
Within Groups	9,019.995	6,510	1.386		

Total	9,036.270	6,512
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Table 20c ranks mean scores on the basis of position on the left-right political scale. No data was available for Iran. Mean scores were identical for all Iraqi groups, and were also the lowest, indicating that Iraqis are equally and strongly opposed to bribery regardless of position on the left-right political spectrum. Indonesian leftists were least opposed.

Table 20c RANKING BY COUNTRY & LEFT-RIGHT POLITICAL SPECTRUM (Accepting a bribe is: 1 = never justifiable; 10 = always justifiable)		
Rank		Mean
1	Iraq – Left	1.1
1	Iraq – Center	1.1
1	Iraq – Right	1.1
4	Indonesia – Right	1.3
4	Egypt – Left	1.3
4	Egypt – Right	1.3
7	Indonesia – Center	1.4
7	Egypt – Center	1.4
9	Indonesia – Left	1.8

Summary of Findings

Table 21 summarizes the findings.

Table 21 Summary of Findings
Overall – All countries were strongly opposed to bribery. However, some were more opposed than others. Iraq was most strongly opposed. Indonesia and Egypt were tied for second place, with Iran showing the least opposition to bribery. Gender – In the aggregate, men and women were equally opposed to bribe taking. Iraqi males were most opposed to bribery, followed by Iraqi females.

Iranian males and females were least opposed to bribery.

Age – The older the people are, the stronger is their opposition to bribe taking.

Ethnicity - Central Asian (Arabic) participants were most opposed to bribery, followed by Javanese and Kurd/Esid. Those least opposed were three Iranian ethnic groups.

Importance of Religion - those for whom religion is most important were more opposed to bribery than those who do not view religion as important.

Religiosity - Those who were not religious were significantly less opposed to bribery than were those in the other two groups.

Marital Status - Widows were most opposed to bribery, followed by those living together as married and divorced, married, single/never married and separated.

Education Level - There seems to be no clear pattern. Those with no formal education and those with a university education tied for being most opposed to bribery, which might make the relationship appear to be curvilinear. However, the other rankings do not support this conclusion.

Employment Status - Full-time employees, retired and *other* were most strongly opposed to bribery. Those who were unemployed were least opposed. Part-timers and the self-employed were only slightly less opposed.

Institution of Occupation - Those who worked at public institutions tended to be most opposed to bribery, while those at private nonprofit institutions tended to be least opposed.

Social Class - Those in the working class were most opposed to bribery, while those in the upper class were least opposed. The relationship was mostly linear.

Income Level - Those in the low and middle income categories had identical mean scores, while those in the high income group had the highest mean score, indicating the least opposition to bribery.

Size of Town - From the distribution, it was difficult to conclude that the relationship was linear because the results were scattered, although one might say that those who lived in larger cities tended to be less opposed to bribery than were other groups.

Happiness - Those who were not at all happy were most strongly opposed to bribery, while those who were very happy were least opposed.

Health – Those in poor health tended to be most opposed to bribery, whereas those in the other three categories tended to be equally and less opposed to bribery. However, the differences in mean scores were not significant.

Confidence in the Police - Three of the four categories had identical mean scores for this variable. Those who placed no confidence at all in the police tended to be least opposed to bribery. However, the differences in mean score were not significant.

Confidence in the Justice System - three of the four categories had identical means, whereas the category of *none at all* had the highest mean score, indicating the least amount of confidence. However, the differences in mean score were not significant.

Confidence in the Government - Those who had a great deal of confidence in the government tended to have the strongest opposition to bribery, whereas those with not very much confidence in the government had the least opposition to bribery. The relationship was not totally linear, however, because those who had no confidence at all in the government were somewhat more strongly opposed to bribery than were those who fell into the *not very much* category.

Left-right Political Spectrum - those on the right and those on the left had identical mean scores, and were most opposed to bribery, whereas those in the center were least opposed. Thus, the distribution is curvilinear.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Although the people in all four Muslim countries were strongly opposed to bribe taking, in general, some groups were more opposed than others. Most of the demographic variables proved to have significant differences in mean scores, but some did not.

Several areas of research could benefit from additional exploration. Attitudes in a number of other countries could be examined. Comparative regional studies could be made. In cases where data are available, longitudinal studies could be made to determine whether views on bribe taking have changed over time.

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